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This article aims at examining the strategic leeway of firms pursuing business
strategies incompatible with the dominant institutional environment in a given
market economy. In order to evaluate this question, we focus on the therapeutic
biotech industry and draw a German–British comparison. Proponents of the
varieties-of-capitalism (VoC) approach assume that German firms underperform
in this industrial sector in comparison to British firms due to the institutional fra-
mework in which German firms operate; this framework is assumed to provide
them with hardly any strategic latitude. The VoC approach is challenged by
two alternative perspectives, in both of which it is believed that firms can have
a high level of strategic leeway; in the first approach this is possible due to insti-
tutional heterogeneity within national market economies; and in the second
approach, the above can be seen as the result of economic internationalization.
Our empirical findings show that British firms are indeed more competitive in the
therapeutical biotech industry, but only to a limited extent. German firms perform
better than projected by the VoC approach because they operate in an institution-
ally heterogeneous environment and due to the impact of internationalization.
Thus, we argue for the integration of these three perspectives in one explanatory
approach.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this article is to evaluate the varieties-of-capitalism (VoC) approach
with regard to its notion of the comparative institutional advantage (CIA) and
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to compare it to competing theoretical perspectives. A key assumption of this
approach is that firms focus on innovation strategies that are supported by the
dominant national institutional framework. A corollary assumption of the CIA
approach is that firms which pursue strategies that are not supported by this
institutional framework—i.e. the framework does not support these strategies
by providing the required input factors—underperform because of their com-
parative institutional disadvantage and therefore have hardly any strategic
leeway in a challenging dynamic market such as the therapeutic biotech industry.
In this article, we follow the conception of institutions implicitly used by Hall and
Soskice (2001), the key proponents of the VoC approach: institutions are con-
ceived as rules that actors follow for material reasons. Relevant to this analysis
are institutions, or rules, that have an impact on the generation of and access
to input factors, which are required for specific innovation strategies. However,
the connection between rules and the provision of input factors might not be
straightforward; constraining rules might also be ‘beneficial’—in the words of
Streeck (1997)—to the generation of input factors.
The notion of the CIA is questioned by two theoretical perspectives: first,
scholars such as Allen (2004) and Schneiberg (2007) have questioned whether
the institutional framework of market economies is as homogeneous as assumed
by proponents of the VoC approach (see also Crouch, 2005). They claim that
national market economies are characterized by institutional heterogeneity,
which means that not all sectors are affected by certain institutions in the same
way, and that apart from the dominant institutional set, institutions might exist
which follow different logics. This strand of literature assumes that as a result of
this kind of institutional heterogeneity, different models of industry organization
are possible within market economies. Second, proponents of internationalization
argue that actors are able to offset detrimental institutions by tapping into foreign
market economies (Black and Gilson, 1998; Ahrweiler et al., 2006). Similarly,
Deeg and Jackson (2007) regard institutional heterogeneity and transnationaliza-
tion as two key challenges to the VoC approach. Hence, these challengers to the
VoC approach assume that firms which pursue strategies that are incompatible
with the dominant institutional framework are potentially able to compete by
relying on input factors provided by other institutions, be they domestic or part
of foreign business systems, and therefore have at least some strategic leeway.
To evaluate the notion of the CIA in relation to innovation strategies, we
selected the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry and more specifically the
development of therapeutics, along with Germany as the market economy,
since, according to proponents of comparative capitalism, the characteristics of
this industry and the institutional framework of Germany do not fit together.
Whereas the dominant institutions of the German economy are seen to be condu-
cive to incremental innovations and detrimental to radical ones, this segment of
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the biotech industry is characterized by radical innovations. The development of
biotherapeutics is radically innovative because the technical risks are extremely
high and most therapeutics fail, the financial costs are tremendous and in the
range of several hundred million US dollars, and the time to market is very
long, at least ten years (Casper, 2000; Casper and Whitley, 2004). Interestingly,
in the mid-1990s, a biotech sector emerged in Germany, and in recent years
many biotech firms have focused on the development of therapeutics. Hence,
this case suits well the overall task of this article. However, in order to assess the
performance of German biotech firms in the pharmaceutical sector and the
extent to which it is supported by the institutional framework, we need to
employ a comparison. We opted for the UK since this market economy is supposed
to have a CIA in radically innovative industries according to proponents of the com-
parative capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; Casper and
Whitley, 2004).
The goal of this article is to raise the question of whether (1) the assumption of a
comparative institutional disadvantage for firmswhich pursue innovation strategies
that are incompatible with the dominant institutions in a given market economy is
valid as argued by proponents of the VoC approach; or, alternatively, (2) if firms
have strategic leeway, and the comparative institutional disadvantage is offset,
because institutions other than the dominant set of their home country—be they
domestic or part of foreign market economies—provide them with the required
input factors, as is argued by proponents of institutional heterogeneity and interna-
tionalization. The case of the German therapeutic biotech industry shows that all of
the above-mentioned theoretical perspectives are corroborated to a certain extent
and thus should be integrated. British biotech firms in the therapeutic segment
are more competitive than their German counterparts and are embedded in an
institutional framework which is more conducive to their success. However,
German firms are only slightly behind in their level of competitiveness. This is
due to the fact that (1) dominant institutions do not affect all sectors in the same
way, (2) new institutions have become established alongside the dominant set
and (3) firms succeed in tapping into Anglo-Saxon market economies. Thereby,
German firms which pursue radical innovation strategies are able to rely on insti-
tutional support—even though not from the dominant institutional framework
of the home country—and to attract the required input factors. Hence, their level
of strategic leeway is much higher than the VoC approach would predict.
The article is structured as follows: in Section 2, the competing literatures of
VoC, institutional heterogeneity and internationalization are outlined. The
research design is delineated in Section 3. To evaluate the propositions of the
theoretical perspectives, we used a research design that relied on a triangulation
of data. Data collection involved semi-structured interviews, publicly available
statistics, information on company websites, biotech reports and journals. The
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focus of the empirical analysis is on Germany, since this is the theoretically con-
troversial case and since the UK is used rather as a control. The field research took
place in 2003–2004. In addition, the empirical material was updated in 2007.
Hence, the research design comprises not only a comparative dimension but
also a longitudinal one. Section 4 describes the German–British comparison in
three subsections that analyse the institutional configurations in which German
and British biotech companies are embedded. In this respect, we also examine
whether the dominant institutional framework of Germany, such as banks,
supports radical innovation strategies. The institutional analysis is focused on
the financial system, technology policy and the labour market. In the fifth and
final section, we outline to what extent the propositions of each theoretical
approach have been corroborated, draw theoretical conclusions and seek to
integrate the three theoretical perspectives.
2. Alternative theoretical frameworks and propositions regarding
the German and British biotech industries
2.1 The VoC approach
A core concept of the VoC approach is that of the CIA. According to this concept,
institutional structures differ between market economies and support some kinds
of economic activities, whereas they impede others. A corollary assumption is
that firms therefore focus on innovation strategies that are supported by the insti-
tutional framework. If they act otherwise, they underperform in comparison to
firms in other market economies that are embedded in more supportive insti-
tutional structures because they are less able to attract the required input
factors for these strategies (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Thus, the level of strategic
leeway of these firms is low.
Hall and Soskice (2001) do not always use the term institution in a consistent
way. On the one hand, they define institutions as ‘a set of rules, formal or infor-
mal, that actors generally follow, whether for normative, cognitive, or material
reasons’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 9). However, in their empirical analysis of
market economies, they focus on the regulative pillar of institutions (Scott,
2008) or on rules that actors follow for material reasons; in this article, we
follow the latter understanding of the term institution. In their conception,
actors in specific market economies support institutional structures, such as
German managers supporting co-determination, because they think that it best
serves their material interest, and not for normative reasons or because they
cannot conceive of alternatives. The link between institutions, or rules, and their
support of innovation strategies does not appear in the form of allowing or restrict-
ing innovation strategies, but rather in the form of providing the required input
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factors for these strategies. The links are sometimes rather indirect; the constrain-
ing character of some rules might also have a positive effect on the generation of
input factors in some cases. Furthermore, proponents of the VoC approach assume
that institutions do not support the generation of input factors independently, but
rather that their effect on innovations is interrelated. Complementarities arise if the
institutions in specific market economies follow a similar logic, which means that
they reinforce each other. In this respect, the VoC approach differs from the
approach of National Innovation Systems (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993), in
which interrelations between institutions are largely ignored.
More specifically, proponents of this approach distinguish between two types
of market economies: liberal market economies (LMEs), as in the USA and Great
Britain, and co-ordinated market economies (CMEs), as in Germany. In LMEs,
institutions promote short-term relations and co-ordination based on market
mechanisms. In contrast, in CMEs, institutions promote long-term relations
and co-ordination based on non-market mechanisms. Proponents of the VoC
approach claim that each type has different strengths and weaknesses that
virtually mirror each other and that originate from their institutional setting.
In LMEs, companies in industries dominated by radical innovations thrive as
these industries require great flexibility, whereas those in industries dominated
by incremental innovations underperform as they cannot freely develop firm-
specific skills. In CMEs, companies in industries dominated by incremental
innovations thrive as they are better able to develop firm-specific skills,
whereas those in industries dominated by radical innovations underperform as
non-market institutions hinder their flexibility. Proponents of the VoC approach
also doubt that these different types of market economies will converge in the
wake of globalization (Hall and Soskice, 2001).
Although Hall and Soskice assert that companies in CMEs have a comparative
disadvantage in radically innovative industries such as biotechnology, a biotech
boom occurred in Germany in the second half of the 1990s, 15 years after the
emergence of the biotech industry in Britain. The delayed start of the German
biotech industry was mainly caused by a hostile regulatory environment, which
improved significantly in 1993. In addition, very important for jump-starting
the sector were government initiatives promoting activities in this sector (Adel-
berger, 2000).
Casper and Whitley (2004) compared the competitiveness of British and
German biotech firms in the therapeutics sector and concluded that the basic
idea of the VoC approach still holds true, i.e. that firms in LMEs have an insti-
tutional advantage in sectors characterized by radical innovations compared
with firms in CMEs, and the former therefore outperform the latter. They
defined competitiveness as the number of therapeutics that companies have in
clinical trials in their respective countries. In brief, in clinical trials, therapeutics
Institutional embeddedness and the strategic leeway of actors 185
are tested for safety and efficacy in human subjects. Clinical trials are subdivided
into three stages: the number of participants increases exponentially from phases
I–III, as do the related costs (Robbins-Roth, 2001). Casper and Whitley (2004)
demonstrated that British biotech companies were clearly more competitive
(Table 1). This was most notable in stage II and III clinical trials, which
involve the highest financial risks: the British biotech companies outperformed
the German companies at a ratio of 59 to 5 (Casper and Whitley, 2004).
Casper and Whitley (2004) interpret the underperformance of the German
biotech firms as a mismatch between the radically innovative characteristics of
this segment and the institutional environment. Firms are in need of flexible
labour markets and investors with industry expertise who are willing to take
risks. The long time horizon of product development in the biotech industry
seems to be at odds with the short-term relations in LMEs. However, this long-
term product development is subdivided into many milestones. Thus, venture
capitalists and shareholders are able to evaluate success on a short-term basis
and to sell their stake prior to the introduction of the product into the market.
In Germany, on the other hand, there is a compatibility issue between the dom-
estic venture-capital industry and the therapeutics sector, since the former
emerged most notably due to government funding and hardly has any investors
with industry expertise. In addition, German labour laws, works councils and
trade unions, along with strong employee representation on the supervisory
board, make dismissals very difficult. Finally, the long-term job protection of
managers in the pharmaceuticals industry gives them little incentive to switch
to a biotech start-up, since in cases of bankruptcy they would face unemploy-
ment. In contrast, British biotech firms are better able to cope with the high
risks in the therapeutics sector due to the existence of an experienced private
venture-capital industry and deregulated labour markets (Casper, 2000; Casper
and Kettler, 2001; Casper and Whitley, 2004). Hence, from the perspective of
the VoC approach, the first proposition can be formulated as follows:
Table 1 Therapeutic compounds pipelines of German and British biotech companies
Pre-clinical Phase I Phase II Phase III Total
UK (public companies)a 32 37 46 13 128
GER (public companies)a 2 2 1 1 6
GER (45 university spin-offs)b 19 10 2 1 32
Source: Casper and Whitley (2004, Table 5, p. 100); original sources: aErnst & Young, European Life Sciences
(2001) and bCasper and Murray (2003).
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(1) German biotech firms developing therapeutics underperform in compari-
son to their British counterparts because the national institutional frame-
work is detrimental to this innovation strategy.
2.2 The institutional heterogeneity approach
Proponents of the VoC approach assume that the various types of market econ-
omies follow a single logic of economic action. This view has been challenged by
scholars such as Schneiberg (2007) and Allen (2004), who claim that national
market economies are characterized by a mix of different types of institutions
and that institutions do not affect all sectors in the same way. Due to this fact,
we term this body of literature the institutional heterogeneity approach. More
specifically, different forms of institutional heterogeneity can be distinguished:
first, Schneiberg (2007) shows, for the example of the American infrastructure
industries, that institutional elements of a co-ordinated market order remained
in place despite the overall victory of a liberal market order and allowed actors
to diverge in their economic behaviour and strategies from the dominant
model. With regard to the German CME, there might be niches where insti-
tutions of a liberal market order have survived and are now providing a platform
for biotech firms developing therapeutics. Second, Allen (2004) argues that not
all national institutions spread uniformly across industries. Third, scholars
such as Streeck and Thelen (2005) assume that market-based institutions can
be established in a CME; however, they expect that in the longer term, these
new institutions—if they function effectively—will result in differential growth
and gradually replace the existing institutional setting. In this respect, they are
placed between the VoC approach and the institutional heterogeneity approach.
These three aspects of institutional heterogeneity increase the strategic leeway
of firms, that is, their ability to pursue strategies that are not supported by the
dominant institutional framework. If we transfer this notion of institutional
heterogeneity to the German market economy and its biotech industry, the
second proposition can be formulated as follows:
(2) German biotech firms which develop therapeutics are equally as competitive
as British biotech firms due to institutional heterogeneity; apart from the
dominant institutional framework of the German CME, a more liberal
institutional setting exists which is conducive to this innovation strategy.
2.3 The internationalization approach
The internationalization approach rests on the assumption that companies are
able to offset detrimental institutional settings by tapping into foreign business
systems. An institution that has received particular attention in this respect is
the market for venture capital. This industry has become increasingly
Institutional embeddedness and the strategic leeway of actors 187
international in recent years and is no longer confined to the USA (Lerner and
Gompers, 2001; Lerner, 2002). The following subsection consists of two parts:
first, we refer to Black and Gilson (1998), who suggested that young high-tech
firms located in a country without a supportive infrastructure would ‘piggyback’
on foreign institutions; in the medium-term, this would lead to the establishment
of a local institutional setting supporting these types of firms. In the second
part, we refer to Ahrweiler et al. (2006), who argue that German biotech firms
pursuing radical innovations are equally as competitive as their British counter-
parts. They consider the German institutional framework to be detrimental to
biotech firms that pursue radical innovations; however, they argue that these
biotech firms are able to offset the disadvantageous institutional setting by
attracting international venture capital.
Black and Gilson (1998) analyse the preconditions of a vibrant venture-capital
market for young high-tech companies and come to the conclusion that a well-
functioning stock market and the possibility of an initial public offering (IPO) as
an exit option for venture capitalists is indispensable. In short, several interrelated
institutions must be established simultaneously in order to create a strong market
for venture capital. Actors in national economies with a bank-centred system,
therefore, face a chicken-and-egg problem: a venture-capital market necessitates
a stock-market segment for young high-tech companies, but such a segment is in
need of a steady supply of deals and entrepreneurs which, in turn, depends on a
venture-capital market. Black and Gilson (1998) assume that it is extremely dif-
ficult and costly to simultaneously create this interrelated set of institutions for
actors in a bank-based system; instead, they recommend accessing the institutions
of foreign countries with stock market-centred systems. They regard Israel as a
prime example of such a strategy (see also Avnimelech and Teubal, 2006). In
Germany, young high-tech companies and their investors could follow this
successful example by attracting foreign investors. This would create potential
for the emergence of local institutions supporting young high-tech companies
(Black and Gilson, 1998).
The contribution of Ahrweiler et al. (2006) dovetails nicely with the contri-
bution of Black and Gilson (1998), as they also emphasize the opportunities of
high-tech firms to offset the lacking supportive infrastructure in their home
country by means of internationalization. Empirically, Ahrweiler et al. (2006)
compare the biopharmaceutical sectors of Germany and Great Britain in terms
of their industrial structure and performance. In their comparison, they
discern striking commonalities between the biopharmaceutical sectors of the
two countries. The majority of German as well as British biotech firms are
engaged in the development of therapeutics. Additionally, they consider the
innovative ability of firms in both countries in terms of the number of thera-
peutics in trials as relatively similar (Table 2).
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Although they identify large commonalities between the German and
the British biopharmaceutical industries, they do not draw the conclusion that
the German institutional setting is conducive to radical innovations; in this
respect, they are in line with the VoC approach. Furthermore, Ahrweiler et al.
reject the notion that Germany has converged to an LME. Instead, they assume
that these commonalities between both countries exist due to internationaliza-
tion. According to Ahrweiler et al., the key weakness of the German institutional
framework for therapeutic biotech firms is the lack of financial support; however,
they assume that these firms are able to offset this disadvantage through inter-
national venture-capital co-operations. Herrmann argues in a similar direction
for the case of the pharmaceutical sector in Germany, Italy and Great Britain
(Herrmann, 2009). Hence, from the perspective of internationalization, the
third proposition can be formulated as follows:
(3) German biotech firms which develop therapeutics are equally as competi-
tive as their British counterparts because they are able to tap into foreign
business systems supportive of such strategies and thereby offset the
detrimental domestic institutional framework.
3. Research design
As stated above, the key objective of this article is to examine to what extent the
assumption of a comparative institutional disadvantage for firms pursuing strat-
egies that are incompatible with the dominant institutions in a given market
economy is valid, or whether that disadvantage is offset by institutional hetero-
geneity and/or internationalization. We selected the therapeutics segment of
the German biotech industry in Germany, because, on the one hand, Germany
is considered a CME, regardless of the fact that a certain amount of liberalization
has occurred in recent years (Beyer and Ho¨pner, 2003; Lane, 2003; Ho¨pner and
Jackson, 2006), and thereby is regarded as prohibitive of radical innovations.
On the other hand, the therapeutic biotech industry is characterized by radical
innovations. In our study, we define a radical innovation in the field of biotech-
Table 2 Therapeutic compounds pipelines of all German and British biotech companies in 2002
Pre-clinical Phase I Phase II Phase III Total
GER (all companies) 117 34 22 3 200
UK (all companies) 65 50 56 23 194
Source: Ahrweiler et al. (2006, Table 2, p. 11).
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based therapeutics as a development project which involves high financial risks
and is based on a radically new therapeutic effect. A ‘new therapeutic effect’
implies that the therapeutic is aimed at a target that has not been validated.
A target is a native substance in the body whose activity may be modified by a
drug, leading to a therapeutic effect. This effect is validated when the therapeutic
with the ‘new therapeutic effect’ has received marketing approval by the regulat-
ory authorities. To develop a therapeutic which is meant to affect a target that has
not yet been validated involves a considerably higher risk and is therefore radi-
cally innovative. We confined our analysis to three institutions: the financial
system, technology policy and the labour market, as these are the institutions
regarded as important in the institutional literature on innovations in the
biotech industry (Adelberger, 2000; Casper, 2000; Ahrweiler et al., 2006). To
examine the question of international competitiveness, an international com-
parison was necessary. Great Britain was selected as the country of comparison
as it has a large biotech industry and is classified as an LME, which, according
to the VoC approach, should outperform Germany in radically innovative
industries. However, our comparison was not balanced, but rather the emphasis
was placed on Germany, since it is the more theoretically controversial case. A
total of 45 interviews were conducted between 2003 and 2004, and 32 of these
45 interviews were conducted in Germany. We interviewed top executives from
14 German biotech firms and selected firms that already had therapeutics in
clinical trials. The selection of these companies was determined by access; the
interview partners were either CEOs or other high-ranking members of the
management team. Key issues in the interviews were company background and
strategy, the technological innovativeness of their therapeutic product(s), and
their perception and evaluation of the institutional fields of the financial
system, the labour market and technology policy. In addition, 18 interviews
were conducted in Germany with experts in these institutional fields, including
8 interviews regarding the financial system (venture-capitalist companies,
banks and associations), 4 regarding the labour market (trade unions, employer
associations and head hunters) and 1 regarding technology policy (the federal
ministry of education and research); and four interviews were conducted with
general experts (consultancies, pharmaceutical corporations and research insti-
tutes). Thematically, these expert interviews were focused on the respective insti-
tutional field from the perspective of the biotech industry. Apart from interviews,
publicly available statistics and other data sources related to the institutions
mentioned were evaluated.
To achieve an international assessment of the German biotech industry, we
questioned four venture capitalists, two each from the USA and Great Britain,
with supervisory board experience in both countries. Key issues were the insti-
tutional setting for German and British biotech firms, their investment criteria,
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and general trends in the global venture-capital industry investing in biotechnol-
ogy. Two interviews were conducted in British therapeutic biotech firms and two
in a consultancy with biotech expertise. Furthermore, five interviews were con-
ducted with innovation researchers who have analysed the British biotech indus-
try extensively. Key issues were the institutional embeddedness and the
development of the British biotech industry.
Several indicators were used to compare the competitiveness of the two indus-
tries in the therapeutics segment: first, the total amount of therapeutic products;
second, marketed therapeutic products; and third, a global ranking of the world’s
most promising biotech start-ups. The total amount of therapeutic products
in development was used as an indicator to ensure compatibility with the
results of Casper and Whitley (2004) and Ahrweiler et al. (2006). However, we
restricted the indicator to therapeutics tested in clinical trials II and III,
because in these phases the financial and technological risks are particularly
high. We conducted surveys in 2004 and 2007 so as to add a longitudinal perspec-
tive. This was important as the biotech industry emerged in Great Britain 10 years
earlier than it did in Germany and, thus, it is likely that British firms have stayed
ahead of their German counterparts regarding this indicator. However, a longi-
tudinal perspective renders it possible to discern whether a catching-up process
is going on and whether the gap, if there is any, is closing. The sources for
Germany were the Informationssekretariat Biotechnologie, Deutsche Bo¨rse AG
and the Jahr- und Adressbuch Biotechnologie. The sources for Britain were the
Department of Trade and Industry, the Bioindustry Association and the
London Stock Exchange (LSE). As a final indicator for competitiveness, we
used the annual selection of the world’s 15 most promising biotech start-ups
made by FierceBiotech, which monitors the global biotech industry.
4. A German–British comparison of biotech companies in the
therapeutic segment
4.1 Competitiveness of German and British biotech companies
The data search yielded a total of 34 biotech firms headquartered in Germany and
34 firms in Great Britain with at least one therapeutic product, including both
large and small molecules, in clinical trials in 2004. The survey was repeated in
2007 and yielded 35 German biotech companies in accordance with this criterion
and 33 in Great Britain. The list of firms surveyed in each country in 2004 and
2007 were not identical. Approximately one-third of the firms surveyed in
2004 disappeared from the list for several reasons: whereas some companies
went bankrupt or had to stop their therapeutic projects, others merged, were
acquired or out-licensed their therapeutic candidates. However, since the
Institutional embeddedness and the strategic leeway of actors 191
companies surveyed in 2004 were not constantly observed until 2007, but rather
the surveys were merely repeated in 2007, it is not possible to state exactly which
specific reasons led to specific disappearances. In addition, we want to point out
that according to our definition of radical innovations, not all, but indeed the
majority, of development projects of the firms in which we conducted interviews
could be classified as radical innovations. A key result of all interviews conducted
was that despite the invention of several new technologies for discovering and
developing drugs—such as combinatorial chemistry, high-throughput screening
and genomics—in the 1990s, the failure rate of therapeutic projects remained
high; thus, the field is still characterized by radical innovations. Furthermore,
four interviews conducted with Anglo-Saxon venture capitalists with experience
in the German and British biotech industries led to the conclusion that no differ-
ences are discernible pertaining to the level of innovativeness of firms’ therapeutic
projects. The results of the surveys are presented in Table 3 and the identities of
the firms in Table 4.
Two main findings pertaining to the results in 2004 stand out: first, British
biotech companies have a significantly larger number of therapeutics in clinical
trials. However, this is not a surprising finding when we take into account that
the British biotech industry emerged 10 years earlier. The second, more surpris-
ing, finding is that the gap between British and German biotech firms regarding
this indicator narrowed considerably between 2001 and 2004. The Casper and
Whitley survey (Table 1), which dates back to 2001, showed that: (1) overall,
British biotech companies had 464.71% more therapeutics in clinical trials
than German biotech companies, and (2) with regard to therapeutics in the
more-expensive stages II and III of clinical testing, British biotech companies
had 1080% more products than their German counterparts. The survey by Ahr-
weiler et al. (2006), which dates back to 2002, showed that, overall, British biotech
companies had 114.76% more therapeutics in clinical trials than their German
counterparts and 216% more therapeutics in stage II and III trials (Table 2).
Our survey, which dates back to 2004, showed that British biotech companies
Table 3 Therapeutic compounds pipelines of German and British biotech companies
Phase I Phase II Phase III Unclear Total
Britain (2004) 52 48 12 9 121
Germany (2004) 25 32 9 2 68
Britain (2007) 51 55 21 0 127
Germany (2007) 38 40 13 4 95
Note: Dates of enquiry: October 2004 and July 2007.
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had 77.94% more therapeutic products in clinical trials than their German
counterparts. With regard to products in clinical stages II and III of testing,
the lead enjoyed by the British had dropped to 46.34% (Table 3).
Although, according to this survey, the difference between British and German
companies regarding therapeutics in clinical trials is much smaller than expected,
there is still a substantial gap. In order to analyse whether German biotech com-
panies have continued to catch up or not, we repeated this survey in 2007 (see
Table 3).
The results for 2007 in Table 3 show that German biotech companies have
continued to catch up with British companies in terms of the total number of
therapeutics in clinical trials; the British lead has dropped drastically from
77.94% in 2004 to 33.68% in 2007. However, regarding the clinical stages II
and III, the German biotech firms have only minimally caught up, since their
British counterparts still have 43.40% more therapeutic candidates in these
stages compared with a lead of 46.34% in 2004. Hence, the catching-up
process of the German biotech firms pertaining to this indicator has slowed
down considerably during the last 3 years, which can be interpreted as an
indication of the superiority of the British firms in this segment.
Table 4 German and British biotech firms with therapeutics in clinical trials in 2004 and 2007
German biotech firms in 2004
4sc, Antisense, Avontec, Axaron, Biofrontera, Biosphings, Biosyn, Cardiopep, CellControl.
CellGenix, Curacyte, Develogen, Genopia, GPC Biotech, G2M, IDEA, Jerini, Jomaa Pharma,
Liponova, Medical Enzymes, Medigene, Micromet, MultImmune, Neurobiotec, Paion,
RESprotect, Revotar, Scil, Sirenade, Selecore, Symbiotec, Trion, Viscum, Wilex
British biotech firms in 2004
Acambis, Alizyme, Antisoma, Arachnova, Arakis, Ardana, Ark Therapeutics, Arrow Thera-
peutics, Biovex, Cambridge Antibody Technology, CeNeS Pharmceuticals, Cyclacel, Evolutec,
Hunter Fleming, Ionix Pharmaceuticals, KuDos, Metris, Microscience, M.L. Laboratories,
Neutec Pharma, Onyvax, Oxford BioMedica, Oxxon Pharmacines, Pharmagene, Pharminox,
Phytopharm, PowderMed, Protherics, Regen Therapeutics, Renovo, SR Pharma, Trigen, Ver-
nalis, Xenova.
German biotech firms in 2007
4sc, Affectis, Antisense, Avontec, Axxonis, Biofrontera, Cardiopep, Cellgenix, Curacyte,
Cytonet, Develogen, Evotec, Faustus Forschungs Compagnie, Ganymed, GPC Biotech, Hei-
delberg Pharma, IDEA, Immatics, Jerini, Jomaa Pharma, Key Neurotech, Liponova, Medical
Enzymes, Medigene, Multimmune, Neuraxo, Paion, Trigen, RESprotect, Revotar, Sygnis
Pharma, Trion, Vasopharm Biotech, Vision J, Wilex.
British biotech firms in 2007
Acambis, Alizyme, Amarin Corporation, Antisoma, Ardana, Ark Therapeutics, Archimedes,
Biovex, BTG, Celldex, CeNeS Pharmaceuticals, Curidium, Cyclacel, Evolutec, Ferring, Hunter
Fleming, Immupharma, Intercytex, Onyvax, Oxagen, Oxford Biomedica, Pharminox, Phynova,
Phytopharm, PowderMed, Prosidion, Protherics, Proxima, Renovo, Silence Therapeutics,
Vastox, Vernalis, Xenova.
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In addition, we analysed how many therapeutics were marketed by biotech
companies in both countries. In 2004, nine therapeutics were marketed by
British biotech firms, while only one was marketed by a German firm; and in
2007 it was 10 and 1, respectively. None of these therapeutics had high market
potential; an Internet analysis revealed that the market potential ranged
betweenE 7 and 100million. In addition, it should bementioned that themajority
of the marketed therapeutics were in-licensed: 6 out of 10 in the case of Great
Britain and 1 (out of one) in the case of Germany. Regarding this indicator,
Great Britain has a clear lead, although its success is far from impressive with
four self-developed marketed therapeutics generating only low market turnover.
Finally, we investigated how many German and British biotech firms were
selected as one of the world’s 15 most promising biotech start-ups by the
journal FierceBiotech in the period from 2003 to 2007. The overwhelming
majority of these firms originated from the USA (61 firms/81.3%), along with
four firms from Great Britain (5.3%) and three firms from Germany (4%). All
British and German biotech firms selected for this prize were active in thera-
peutics development. This indicates the superiority of the British biotech
industry over that of Germany, and also that Germany is only slightly behind.
From this analysis we can draw the following conclusion: on the one hand, the
British biotech industry is more competitive in the therapeutic segment than the
German one. With regard to the number of therapeutics in clinical trials in stages
II and III, British biotech companies have a substantial lead, and this lead has not
been shortened significantly since 2004. Additionally, British biotech companies
engaged in the therapeutics segment have an advantage concerning marketed
therapeutics. On the other hand, there are strong indications that German
biotech firms active in the therapeutics segment are not far behind in their
level of competitiveness. Regarding the total number of therapeutics in clinical
trials, the German biotech firms have caught up considerably and have a substan-
tial number of therapeutics in the latest clinical stage. The annual selection of the
world’s 15 most promising biotech start-ups also shows that German therapeutic
biotech companies are internationally competitive.
4.2 Comparison of the German and British institutional environments for
therapeutical biotech firms
The financial system for therapeutical biotech firms in Germany and Great Britain
In order to assess the financial systems in both countries, this section is structured
as follows: first, we describe the emergence of the German and the British
venture-capital industries and stock exchanges relevant for biotech firms.
Second, we compare both countries in terms of annual venture-capital invest-
ments, the capital raised by therapeutical biotech firms via IPOs as well as the
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market capitalization of publicly listed therapeutical biotech firms. The annual
venture-capital investments and the capacities of the stock exchanges for thera-
peutical biotech companies in terms of market capitalization and capital raised
via IPOs have been measured since 2004 so as to avoid bias introduced by the
2000 biotech boom, which notably occurred in Germany. The year 2004 was
selected as the initial point of comparison because in this year, the IPO
window for biotech firms reopened in Europe after being closed for 2 years.
Finally, we reflect on the relevance of the key actors of the German CME,
banks and large corporations, for financing the domestic biotech industry.
The profile of venture capitalists engaged in the German biotech industry has
changed considerably over the past several years. In 1995, only two venture–
capital companies with expertise in biotech existed in Germany: Atlas Venture
from the Netherlands and Techno Venture Management (TVM), a German–
USA venture-capital house. The latter was founded in 1984 by Siemens, the
private German bank Matuschka, and representatives of a British (Advent
Limited) and an American venture-capital company (TA Associates). Investors
included many large German corporations. However, they largely withdrew in
the 1990s and were replaced by foreign investors.
Owing to government initiatives, many new venture-capital funds investing in
biotech have emerged since 1995. However, in contrast to the inception of TVM,
large German corporations did not play a role in supporting domestic biotech
start-ups. Several experienced foreign venture-capital companies also invested
in the nascent German biotech industry. In 1997, the Deutsche Bo¨rse created
the Neuer Markt as a segment for young high-tech companies. Thereby, compa-
nies that were not yet profitable could also go public. Five biotech companies suc-
ceeded in going public in 1999; their share prices rose tremendously in 2000 in
the wake of a global biotech boom, which, in turn, increased biotech-related
venture-capital activities. However, most of these investors lacked industry
experience, including, for example, German saving banks that had set up venture-
capital funds for biotech start-ups. A new phase began in 2002, after biotech com-
panies were devaluated on a global scale at the end of 2001. Because of this, 90%
of the venture capitalists, including the saving banks, stopped investing in the
German biotech industry, resulting in a sharp decrease in invested venture
capital. The massive withdrawal of German investors was, according to a repre-
sentative of one of Germany’s few experienced venture-capital companies, to a
certain extent offset by foreign investors, particularly from the USA and Great
Britain. This view is corroborated by the fact that the percentage of foreign invest-
ment in financing rounds of 5 million euros or more was 62% in 2003 compared
with 30% in 2002, although in 2006 the percentage of German investors recovered
to 61% in financing rounds of this dimension (Ernst & Young, 2004, p. 92).
Nevertheless, foreign investors, with a rate of 39% in 2006, have remained
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important for the financing of German biotech companies. Furthermore, it is
noteworthy that biotech funds of German venture-capital firms are mainly
financed by foreign investors, as was revealed in interviews with German
venture capitalists.
In Great Britain, technology-based venture-capital investments became
popular in the 1980s, and established US technology funds served as a role
model. However, in the period between 1984 and 1988, the percentage of techno-
logy investments dropped significantly from 33.3% of the value of total invest-
ments to 8.9%. This was due to the fact that many venture capitalists shifted
their focus to mature industries (Murray and Lott, 1995). In 1980, the Unlisted
Securities Market (USM) was established to improve financing opportunities
for young high-tech companies. This step occurred because the LSE rules did
not allow the listing of companies that could not prove 5 years of profitable
trading, which was hardly possible for young biotech companies. In the early
1990s, these strict rules were relaxed; this was due to the fact that two British
high-tech firms succeeded in going public on the NASDAQ; the LSE was afraid
of losing investment opportunities (Senker, 1996). In 1995, the USM was replaced
by the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), which allows companies to float
shares with a more flexible regulatory system than is applicable to the main
market.
Pertaining to venture capital in the period from 2004 to 2006, the amount
invested annually in the German biotech industry was in 2004 and 2006 below
the level of investments in the British biotech industry, but it exceeded the
latter in 2005 (Table 5).
It must be stressed that according to the Ernst & Young reports about the
German biotech industry, the majority of the large financing rounds were
related to therapeutics firms (Ernst & Young, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007). On
average, the venture-capital investments in this industry accounted for 287.33
million euros in Great Britain compared with 258.33 million euros in
Germany. Even though this is not a large difference, the British financial
system is superior in terms of this indicator. In this context, the tax environment
for venture-capital funds must be mentioned; according to the Benchmark of the
Table 5 Annual venture capital investments (in million euros) in the British and German biotech
industries
Year 2004 2005 2006
UK 366 257 238
D 236 326 213
Source: Ernst & Young (2007, pp. 71–72)
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European Venture Capital Association (EVCA), in 2008, it was more favourable in
Great Britain than in Germany.1 In interviews, German venture-capital managers
complained about the lack of clarity regarding the taxation of funds. However, the
negative effect on venture-capital activities in Germany is negligible, since funds
can easily be set up in countries with more favourable tax regimes, as was often
pointed out in interviews in Germany. The German venture-capital company
Wellington Partners, for example, set up their fund in Guernsey due to the
legal situation in Germany (Maier, 2004).
In the same period, therapeutical biotech companies raised the total amount
of 241.96 million euros in IPOs on the LSE in Great Britain, compared with 158.3
million euros in IPOs on the Deutsche Bo¨rse in Germany. On the LSE, 10 IPOs of
therapeutical biotech firms occurred, whereas on the Deutsche Bo¨rse there were
only four. Similarly to venture-capital investments, these results indicate a slight
but significant advantage of the British financial system pertaining to IPOs of
therapeutical biotech companies. The advantage of the British financial system
is also reflected in the case of the Germany-based firm Atugen. In 2004–2005,
the company’s management was confronted with a lack of financing opportu-
nities and used the financial instrument of a reverse takeover in order to get
financing from British institutional investors. A reverse takeover occurs when a
publicly traded smaller company acquires ownership of a larger company.
Atugen conducted a reverse takeover into SR Pharma, which was publicly
listed on the AIM of the LSE. The latter company had only two employees in
London and very low cash reserves. Through this reverse takeover, the newly
built company combined several products in development and a promising tech-
nology with direct access to the British capital market. It succeeded 4 weeks after
the reverse takeover in acquiring 15 million euros from British investors. This
would have been more difficult for Atugen without direct access to the British
capital market (Ernst & Young, 2007, p. 89).
Pertaining to the market capitalization of therapeutical biotech firms on the
respective stock exchanges, the final results were: from 2005 to 2007 (date of
surveys: July 15, 2005 and September 16, 2007), the market capitalization of
companies listed on the LSE rose from 2.343 billion euros (based on 19
companies) to 3.176 billion euros (based on 31 companies). In the same
period, the market capitalization of companies listed on the Deutsche Bo¨rse
rose from 0.974 billion euros (based on 6 companies) to 1.543 billion euros
(based on 11 companies).
The key actors of the German CME, large corporations and banks, were only
of minor relevance for the financing of the domestic biotech start-ups. Large
1European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, benchmark accessed at http://www.evca.
eu/uploadedFiles/08-10-08-PR_Benchmark.pdf on October 12, 2008.
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German corporations such as Siemens, Volkswagen and Mannesmann were active
in the inception of TVM in 1986, the first professional venture-capital group in
this country; however, this remained the only activity in this direction. These cor-
porations were not involved in establishing venture-capital groups in the
mid-1990s biotech boom; surprisingly, savings banks played a role in this
process but withdrew in the downturn of the industry. Even though German
corporations such as Allianz AG invest in venture-capital funds, they avoid
funds based in Germany because they are regarded as lacking experience.
When the German venture-capital group Wellington Partners set up a new
fund in 2004, investors originated mostly from abroad (Maier, 2004). Besides,
interviews showed that loans are not an option for German therapeutic
biotech companies; this is due to the high risks in this sector and the fact that
they cannot lend against security.
To sum up, the financial system of Great Britain regarding therapeutic biotech
firms outperforms that of Germany in terms of all analysed indicators. However,
the difference between the two countries pertaining to these indicators is small.
This is due to the fact that investors from abroad have become interested in
the German biotech industry—particularly, therapeutical biotech companies.
Additionally, it is notable that in 2006, domestic investors regained the majority
in venture-capital rounds of German biotech companies, and the IPO window
reopened for German therapeutic biotech firms after the burst of the New
Economy bubble in 2001. Large German corporations and banks have not
played a significant role in the financing of this industry.
Technology policy and public funding for therapeutic biotech companies in Germany
and Great Britain
In order to assess the importance of government funding for therapeutic biotech
companies, we analysed which programmes have been available for firms in both
countries. In addition, we investigated how much public funding was received by
German and British biotech firms with therapeutics in clinical development, what
the sources of this funding were and for what purposes these grants could have
been used.
In Germany, the first federal funding programme was the BioRegio competition.
Three regions received a total of 90 million euros, and 100 biotech companies were
funded with this capital from 1997 to 2002. The BioChance (1999–2004) and Bio-
ChancePlus (2004–2006) programmes that followed had grant volumes of 50 and
100 million euros, respectively. The tbg, a publicly-owned investment bank, also
plays an important role in financing German therapeutics companies. The tbg
invests up to 1.5 million euros in young technology companies. As shown in
Table 6, tbg investments peaked in 2000, when they reached 136 million euros,
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but decreased sharply in the following years since many biotech companies went
bankrupt subsequent to the downturn of the biotech industry in 2001–2002.
Britain, on the other hand, has no government programmes explicitly
designed for funding biotech companies. However, there are grant programmes
for which biotech companies can also apply. The most important is the LINK
Collaborative Research Scheme, which was established in 1986. The LINK
focuses on supporting research partnerships between the public-sector science
base and industry in Britain and is funded by the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI). In 1997, the total grants for biotechnology-related LINK research
programmes amounted to 23 million euros. Several other public seed funds were
set up in the 1990s with the goal of improving technology transfer via company
spin-offs (Martin, 2000). Moreover, 15 seed funds were established at British uni-
versities within the scope of the government’s University Challenge Seed Fund
Scheme, with total endowments of 65 million euros.2
To examine the extent to which German and British biotech companies have
access to government funding, we evaluated the available data on the websites of
the companies with therapeutics in clinical trials contained in Tables 7 and 8 for
the period from 2000 to 2007: whereas German companies received 30.26 million
euros, their British counterparts received 24.66 million euros of public funding;
the difference is small. Furthermore, interviews with biotech therapeutics firms in
both countries showed, first, that government funding was of minor relevance
compared with overall funding and, second, that funding from the EU could
not be used for therapeutics in clinical trials because this is not considered
pre-competitive.
What is notable is that a considerable percentage of the funding does not orig-
inate from domestic sources; more specifically, this proves true for 26.20% (7.93
million euros) in the case of Germany and even 67.60% (16.67 million euros) in
the case of Great Britain. Even if we consider funding from the EU as a domestic
source, 10.34% of funding received by German firms and 34.67% of funding
received by British firms are of foreign origin. The most important reason for
this striking finding is that public funding in the USA is also available for
Table 6 Investments (in million euros) of the tbg in the German biotech industry
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
tbg 5.91 4.47 19.04 59.13 83.03 135.1 65.24 15.0 9.0
Source: Presented in October 2003 by the tbg and the venture capital company TVM in Cologne.
2Department of Trade and Industry, accessed at http://www.dti.gov.uk/ministers/archived/
sainsbury100400.html on April 27, 2005.
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non-US companies. In contrast to funding within the EU, this is even possible for
therapeutics in clinical trials. This is due to the fact that the key objective in the
US public funding is in many cases not the improvement of national competitive-
ness but the improvement of health. Executives of several German biotech firms
remarked, pertaining to technology policy, that clearly the USA, and not Europe
or Germany, would be the place where firms in this sector could acquire huge
sums of government funding and were amused about the image of the USA as
a free market economy with hardly any government interference.
Table 8 List of British biotech companies with therapeutics in clinical trials which have received
public funding (in million euros)
Acambis US Department of Defense (1 M); US National Institutes of Health (2.51 M)
Ark EU (1.2 M); The Employment and Economic Development Centre of Finland
(2.19 M)
Cyclacel DTI (0.66 M); Scottish Executive (0.66 M)
Immupharma ANVAR, ANR / France (1 M)
Intercytex DTI (2.72 M)
KUDOS DTI (0.7 M)
Onyvax EU (4.2 M)
Oxford
BioMedica
Department of Health (0.73 M); DTI (1.31 M); DTI (0.37 M); DTI (0.58 M); DTI
(0.2 M)
Protherics Welsh Assembly Government (1.47 M)
SR Pharma US National Institutes of Health (1.85 M)
Vastox Welsh Development Agency (0.4 M); DTI (0.91 M)
Total 24.66
Source: Websites of companies in Table 4 (dates of enquiry October 2004 and July 2007).
Table 7 List of German biotech companies with therapeutics in clinical trials which have received
public funding (in million euros)
4sc EU (2.2 M); EU (1.3 M); BMBF (2.9 M); EU (1.3 M)
Biofrontera State of North Rhine-Westphalia (4 M)
Curacyte BMBF (1.1 M); State of Thuringia (1.7 M); NIH/USA (unknown)
Develogen BMBF (4.0 M); BMBF (1.0 M)
GPC Biotech BMBF (2.2 M)
Immatics BMBF (1.2 M); BMBF (0.56 M)
Jerini BMBF (0.85 M)
Medigene BMBF (0.4 M)
Selecore BMBF (1 M); BMBF (0.5 M)
Wilex US Department of Defense (3.13 M); BMBF (0.92 M)
Total 30.26
Source: Websites of companies in Table 4 (dates of enquiry October 2004 and July 2007).
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To conclude, government policy played a more active role in the emergence
of the biotechnology industry in Germany than in Great Britain. However,
in recent years, the differences have shrunk. Apart from that, biotech companies
with therapeutics in clinical trials received around 25 million euros in
Great Britain and around 30 million euros in Germany from 2000 to 2007.
These amounts pale in comparison to the average development costs of
therapeutics.
The Labour market for therapeutic biotech companies in Germany and Great
Britain
In line with proponents of the VoC approach, experienced venture-capital man-
agers in both countries reported a greater lack of managers with a background in
pharmaceuticals in German biotech companies than in British ones. However, the
cause of this relative scarcity remains disputed. From the venture-capital
managers’ perspective, the main reason was the consolidation process in the
pharmaceutical industry, which started in Britain 10 years earlier than in
Germany. Since this process has also started in German pharmaceutical compa-
nies in recent years, they feel that this difference should vanish over time. On the
other hand, managers at two German biotech firms stated that it is because of
long-term job security that they have great difficulty in attracting managers
from German pharmaceutical companies. However, these two companies went
bankrupt soon after the interviews. One may therefore assume that their financial
fragility may have also been a cause for their difficulties in recruiting pharmaceutical
managers. Although the British labour market is deregulated, many British biotech
companies experienced similar problems when their financial positions were rather
precarious in the 1980s (Martin and Thomas, 1998). Nevertheless, most German
biotech companies at which interviews were conducted had attracted managers
with previous experience in the pharmaceutical industry. According to a head
hunter, pharmaceutical managers are often willing to move to a German biotech
company if they are positive about the longevity of the company.
In addition, our analysis showed that German biotech companies can dismiss
employees in the case of financial difficulty or project failure since hardly any
of these companies are profitable. Dismissals are possible under German
labour law, provided that the company can demonstrate a direct effect of negative
circumstances on employment. The basic difference is that the minimum period
of notice is 3–6 months in German biotech companies compared with only 1
month in British ones. Company law also does not prohibit biotech companies
from dismissing employees since an employee representation of 50% on the
supervisory board—which is often an effective hurdle against dismissals—is
only required for companies with more than 1500 employees. In addition,
works councils are extremely rare in German biotech firms, a fact which is
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based, in part, on the fact that scientists tend to pursue their interests individu-
ally. Trade unions are absent in the German biotech industry, at least in the area of
pharmaceutical biotechnology. Finally, our analysis of the websites of German
biotech firms with therapeutics in clinical trials in 2004 revealed that they used
the supervisory board to attract the additional expertise often lacking in these
firms: venture-capital managers were the largest group with 45%, the majority
originating from abroad and most notably from the US and Great Britain. The
second largest group, with 23%, were top managers from the pharmaceutical
industry mainly originating from Germany.
To conclude, the labour law in Great Britain is more advantageous than in
Germany for biotech therapeutics firms: British firms are able to dismiss employ-
ees more quickly than their German counterparts and are better able to attract
pharmaceutical managers. On the other hand, these differences are rather
small. German therapeutic biotech firms are able to dismiss a considerable
percentage of their employees without legal problems within a short period of
time, and they are also able to attract managers from the pharmaceutical industry
in Germany. Finally, works councils rarely exist in the German biotech industry.
5. Conclusion
The thrust of this contribution has been to analyse the extent to which firms pur-
suing strategies that are not promoted by the dominant institutions in their home
country are economically sustainable, and thereby to evaluate the strategic leeway
of actors. Proponents of the VoC approach assume that it is low, because firms lack
the input factors required for these strategies and therefore underperform. In con-
trast, proponents of the institutional heterogeneity and internationalization
approaches regard the level of strategic leeway as considerably high. They assume
that these firms are able to rely on institutions other than the dominant framework
of their home country—be they divergent domestic institutions or part of
foreign market economies—and by that means they are able to compete. In the
following, we first outline in which ways the propositions of the three theoretical
perspectives have been corroborated before we draw theoretical conclusion.
The VoC approach has been supported since German therapeutic biotech
firms are less competitive than their British counterparts. Furthermore, the insti-
tutional environment in Great Britain is more favourable. On the other hand,
differences are much smaller than predicted by this approach. German firms
are only slightly less competitive. Besides, German therapeutic biotech firms
are able to dismiss employees and attract pharmaceutical managers, and they
are not considerably behind in terms of acquiring venture capital or raising
capital via IPOs.
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The institutional heterogeneity approach is corroborated because apart from
the national institutional framework of a CME, a more liberal institutional
setting exists which supports biotech firms which develop therapeutics. One
reason for this institutional heterogeneity is that institutions do not spread uni-
formly across all industries and companies. The strong dismissal protection in
Germany applies only to companies with large financial reserves; similarly,
employee representation in the supervisory board, which strengthens dismissal
protection, only applies to large companies, and codetermination is virtually
non-existent in this sector. Additionally, new institutions have become estab-
lished that support young high-tech companies: unprofitable firms are now
allowed to go public and a small group of professional domestic venture-capital
funds has emerged.
According to proponents of internationalization, firms are able to offset a dis-
advantageous institutional setting by tapping into foreign business systems and
using their institutions. This proved true particularly for the financial system.
At present, foreign investors are important for the German biotech industry,
since they invest substantially and thereby prevented a breakdown of the sector
after 2001. Additionally, German venture-capital companies set up their funds
abroad to avoid the unfavourable domestic legal environment. Surprisingly, also
in the field of government funding, actors have the opportunity to acquire inter-
national financial support, most notably from the USA. Finally, German firms use
the supervisory board to gain additional expertise from foreign venture capitalists.
To sum up, each of the three theoretical perspectives has been confirmed to a
certain extent. As assumed by the VoC approach, the institutional environment
in Great Britain is more favourable for biotech therapeutics companies than in
Germany, and firms are competitive. Thus, the level of strategic leeway of actors
is lower than expected by proponents of internationalization and institutional
heterogeneity; the fact that British biotech therapeutics firms are more successful
than the German ones indicates that the latter are not able to offset the less favour-
able institutional environment completely. However, the competitive advantage of
British firms in this radically innovative segment is minimal. Thus, we conclude
that actors have more strategic leeway than projected by the VoC approach.
This is due to the fact that it overestimates the institutional homogeneity of the
German market economy and that internationalization lessens the effect of an
unfavourable institutional environment. Whereas the VoC approach suggests
that globalization tends to increase divergence between different types of
market economies, the case of the German biotech industry shows that actors
are able to expand their strategic leeway by means of internationalization and
thereby reduce this divergence. Although the biotech industry is relatively small
in terms of employment and turnover, the results are important beyond this
industry. This is due to the fact that the therapeutical biotech sector in the
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German CME can be considered an extreme case because these companies have to
deal with very high financial and technological risks which are not supported by
the dominant institutional framework.
As a consequence of the empirical results, we argue for an integration of insti-
tutional heterogeneity and internationalization into the VoC approach. Further-
more, institutional heterogeneity and internationalization should not be seen in
isolation from one another but rather as interrelated; for instance, international
venture capitalists have been crucial for the emergence of professional domestic
venture-capital companies in Germany. The conceptualization of the interplay of
the dominant institutions of a market economy, institutional heterogeneity and
internationalization would also allow a more dynamic perspective on business
systems and how they change and evolve.
An open question is whether the establishment of radically innovative sectors in
the German CME could lead to an institutional layering, which results in differen-
tial growth and eventually will lead to a profound liberalization (Streeck and
Thelen, 2005, p. 23). We assume that institutional layering will take place and
that the market for venture capital and the segment for young high-tech companies
at the stock exchange will grow. However, we doubt that this process will gradually
replace the dominant institutions of the German CME. We should keep in mind
that the number of biotech companies and the jobs that they create is miniscule
in comparison to such industries as special machinery or automobiles. Hence, a
profound liberalization of the German market economy in order to strengthen
high-tech firms pursuing radical innovation strategies is unlikely.
In this article, we showed that the German market economy is institutionally
heterogeneous and that firms are able to benefit from the institutions of foreign
business systems, particularly LMEs. This result is of significant importance to
the VoC debate because it challenges its proponents’ implicit assumptions
about the institutional homogeneity of national market economies and the neglig-
ibility of the strategic leeway of firms for the example of Germany, which is con-
sidered the typical case of a CME. Furthermore, there are also indications in the
empirical data of this article that not only Germany, but also the USA, is institu-
tionally more heterogeneous than expected by VoC proponents. The fact that
biotech firms were able to receive substantial public funding from the USA,
even for product development in late stages, shows that it is not the clear-cut
LME which it is often characterized as. In fact, government programmes are
quite important for the American high-tech industries. According to Lerner
(1999), there were 28 public subsidy programmes for small high-tech companies
in the USA in 1995, which provided high-tech firms grants totalling $2.4 billion. In
comparison, the amount of private venture capital invested in such companies in
1995 was $3.9 billion (Lerner, 1999). Etzkowitz (2003) estimated the amount of
public venture capital provided in 2003 to be $ 3.5 billion, leading him to conclude
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that there was a ‘public venture-capital strategy’ in post-war US science policy.
An intriguing future research question could be: to what extent are government
funding and venture-capital investments in the US interrelated?
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